Archive for the ‘Tax Court’ Category

An Incorrect 1099-C Leads to Tax Court

Monday, May 21st, 2012

A taxpayer receives a notice of canceled debt income (Form 1099-C). He disputes the notice, stating that instead of the debt being canceled in 2008, the debt went away years earlier — 1996. The IRS says the notice says you have income so pay up. The dispute ends up in Tax Court. Who wins?

The taxpayer in question received a credit card from MBNA, and back in 1994 defaulted. MBNA wrote off the debt in 1996. In late 2007, a collection company (Portfolio Recovery Associates) acquired the debt from another collection agency (NCO Portfolio Management). PRA tries to collect, but the taxpayer writes a letter saying stop and the company ceases collection activities. PRA sends the taxpayer a Form 1099-C.

(Interestingly, the Court noted that a state statute of limitations had already expired on the debt in 2001. Thus, no one should be taking collection activities on the debt. If I were the Attorney General of Illinois, I might want to send a letter to PRA. But I digress….)

The Court found that the debt was discharged in 1998:

Without specific evidence to the contrary, it would appear that petitioner’s debt was discharged in 1999 when it was clear that the debt would not be repaid…

Respondent contends that petitioner’s debt was discharged in 2008 when PRA issued Form 1099-C. A decision by a creditor to discontinue collection activity may require that creditor to issue a Form 1099-C…It appears from the record that PRA attempted to revive the defaulted account in an attempt to coerce petitioner, using automated mailing and automated telephone calls, to make voluntary payments to PRA despite over a decade of nonpayment and an expired limitations period…

Therefore, on the basis of the record and after a practical assessment of the facts and circumstances surrounding the likelihood of repayment, we hold that petitioners did not have any COI income from PRA in 2008.

So the taxpayer today does not have canceled debt income.

One final point: Although the opinion doesn’t state this, it appears this case is the result of a CP2000. It is almost certain that the individuals who reviewed the responses from the taxpayer did not grasp the idea that not all IRS notices are correct.

Case: Stewart v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary 2012-46

It Pays to Read the Lease

Thursday, January 19th, 2012

Today the Tax Court looked at whether a rental was passive or active. But there was a major difference from most such cases: The taxpayer claimed his lease was passive while the IRS thought it was not passive.

Most of the time, rental income is passive. There are some exceptions: The most common is a Realtor (who meets the time requirements). The petitioner in today’s case was a doctor, and in almost all cases the rental would be passive. However, the lessee was his business (a professional corporation), so the self-renting rules apply (unless there’s an exception).

The petitioner claimed he had a legal, binding contract (a lease) entered into in 1980. If there is a binding contract entered into on or before February 19, 1988, the exception applies. There was a problem, though. The lease called for payments that would increase by 5% per year (the lease had never been modified). The payments made as “rental expense” didn’t match what was required under the lease. That meant the lease was not a binding contract, and the taxpayer had non-passive income.

For the taxpayer, this could have been resolved had he (or his CPA) noted the terms of the lease and made payments based on the lease. Unfortunately for them, they didn’t read it.

Case: Samarasinghe v. Commissioner (T.C. Memo 2012-23)

IRS Acquiesces to Decision in Mayo v. Commissioner

Tuesday, December 27th, 2011

The IRS has acquiesced to the decision in Mayo v. Commissioner; this decision will be published in the January 17, 2012 issue of the Internal Revenue Bulliten according to Linda Beale. The Mayo case allows a professional gambler to deduct his business expenses in excess of his net gambling income (to create a loss).

The effects of this are minor. Had the IRS continued to fight this decision, impacted taxpayers could (and presumably would) cite this case and would eventually prevail in court.

Discussion of Decision (January 2011)

If You Fail Four Times, the Fifth Time Won’t be the Charm

Wednesday, November 23rd, 2011

As I’ve said, there is an income tax and you do need to pay it. Today’s petitioner in Tax Court didn’t like that idea and filed case after case in Tax Court citing frivolous arguments.

In 2006, the petitioner received just over $45,000 in military retirement. He didn’t file a tax return, so the IRS prepared a Substitute for Return. A notice of deficiency was sent and the petitioner timely filed a Tax Court petition. That was about the only thing that was done correctly — the timely filing.

Unfortunately for the petitioner,

At no time before or during trial did petitioner attempt to substantiate any deduction or dispute the receipt of income that was included in the statutory notice. At all times petitioner has relied solely on frivolous arguments about tax return filing requirements, preparation of substitutes for returns, and procedures for determination of tax deficiencies and additions to tax.

It’s not good when the Court can cite a case you brought up as a precedent against you:

Petitioner continues to take up this Court’s valuable time and resources with frivolous and irrelevant arguments. To expand upon his contentions is simply not necessary. As this Court stated recently in Wheeler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-188: “To do so would be to encourage the dilatory conduct that * * * [petitioner] has employed throughout the history of this case and would neither dissuade petitioner nor provide useful guidance to taxpayers with legitimate cases.”

Not only did the petitioner lose the case, but the maximum possible frivolous penalty was awarded — $25,000. The Court also noted that his appeals (to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals) have also started to receive sanctions (penalties). He escaped without penalty on his first appeal, was sanctioned $4,000 on the second appeal, and $6,000 on the third.

The only good news out of this case is that the petitioner is helping to reduce the budget deficit.

Case: Wheeler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2011-278

Paranomastically, Ecdysiasts Engaging in Deciduous Calisthenics (And Some Basis, too)

Wednesday, November 23rd, 2011

I need to thank Judge Mark Holmes of the Tax Court. Judge Holmes wrote an opinion today that is wonderful and has expanded my vocabulary. It’s also a great case.

Robert Willson bought a bar in Des Moines, Iowa. His bar burned down in 1994, but he persevered and rebuilt. However, Des Moines condemned his bar to expand the city’s airport. The IRS claimed that there was a large capital gain when the city condemned his bar. Mr. Willson disputed that, and the case ended up in Tax Court.

Mr. Willson’s bar catered to hair bands until one of the bands misused a smoke machine and caused the place to burn down. He rebuilt the bar, and rather than my paraphrasing the decision, here’s what Judge Holmes wrote:

He rented out the old house to a tenant who installed minor improvements (e.g., poles) and opened an establishment felicitously–and paronomastically–called the “Landing Strip,” in which young lady ecdysiasts engaged in the deciduous calisthenics of perhaps unwitting First Amendment expression…He also used $169,000 of his $200,000 insurance proceeds to rebuild the bar.

Two things happened around 1999: Des Moines condemned his property and the petitioner visited ClubFed. Mr. Willson did file his 2000 tax return, and the IRS did audit the return. The issue that had to be determined was Mr. Willson’s basis in the bar.

One key issue in the case is the fact that it is a small Tax Court case — an “S case.”

Rule 174(b) allows a taxpayer like Willson to introduce evidence in an S case that would otherwise not be admissible, and it lets us conduct the trial as informally as possible (consistent with orderly procedure) and to admit any evidence we decide has “probative value”–a fancy way of saying any evidence that helps or hurts Willson’s case. This looser rule is important here, because Willson presented his case quite credibly through his own testimony and that of others who worked at the bar or lived nearby during its heyday. Despite the raffish pasts of Willson and some of his witnesses, we found their testimony on his investment in the bar entirely credible.

Basis is always a troubling issue to explain, and this case is messy because of the fire. This case includes both ACRS and MACRS, boot, a fire, and other adjustments. The rest of the case goes into the formula that must be used to determine Mr. Willson’s capital gain. While “there are computations that still need to be made,” it appears that Mr. Willson will likely not owe as much as the IRS claimed.

Case: Willson v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary 2011-132

The Tax Court Expects a Tax Preparer to Know How to Substantiate Deductions

Tuesday, November 8th, 2011

An unenrolled tax professional found herself in Tax Court yesterday. The IRS claimed that her claimed deductions weren’t valid; she felt she had even more deductions coming. The Court had to determine who was right.

First, I’m an enrolled tax professional; I’m in one of three professions with full rights to practice at the IRS. I’m an Enrolled Agent. The petitioner was identified as just a tax preparer, so she wasn’t an EA, CPA, or attorney. There are some good unenrolled preparers (Robert Flach, for example), so being unenrolled isn’t necessarily a bad thing.

However, if you prepare tax returns you are supposed to know the rules about what is and isn’t deductible. You do have to have substantiation for the deductions you take. And the first problem was her records.

Petitioner presented canceled checks, bank account statements, receipts, and invoices purporting to substantiate various items claimed as business expense deductions. These records are not well organized and have not been submitted to the court in a fashion that allows for easy association with the portions of deductions that remain in dispute. Nevertheless, we make what sense we can with what we have to work with and summarize our findings in the following paragraphs.

The petitioner claimed nearly $35,000 of contract labor expense but there was a problem. “None of
the numerous receipts petitioner offered in support of her claimed contract labor expense were for contract labor.” She did have a few receipts mixed in with the contract labor items that were deductible elsewhere, but that was a major misstep. She tried to get something at trial, but wasn’t successful:

At trial petitioner attempted to claim a deduction for additional contract labor expenses. Petitioner introduced photocopies of checks and a few pages of someone’s handwritten timesheet. The checks are photocopied such that the dates are missing or incomplete, and the full amount cannot be determined for one of the checks. These records are incomplete, and there is not enough information to permit a reasonable estimate. Accordingly, respondent’s complete disallowance of petitioner’s $34,880 deduction for contract labor is sustained.

There’s more on specific deductions, but you should get the picture. This tax preparer didn’t do a particularly good job with her own records. The IRS asked the Court to impose an accuracy-related penalty.

The accuracy-related penalty is not imposed with respect to any portion of the underpayment as to which the taxpayer shows that he or she acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. Sec. 6664(c)(1); Higbee v. Commissioner, supra at 448. Petitioner offered no evidence that she acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is liable for a section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty due to negligence or disregard of rules or regulations.

All tax professionals are held to a high standard if you end up at Tax Court: We are supposed to know the rules of substantiation. If we don’t, the Court isn’t going to be sympathetic at all.

Case: Linzy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-264

You Can’t Take It With You When You’ve Already Given It Away

Wednesday, August 10th, 2011

If I give my brother $100, do I still have that $100? Of course not: My brother has that. The same holds true for any gift I give him; that property is now his and I have to live with the consequences of that gift. Today, the Tax Court looked at a situation where an individual gave a gift but said he hadn’t done so.

The Tax Court noted the issue quite well: “The issue for decision is whether distributions petitioner received from an S corporation exceeded his adjusted basis in the corporation’s stock.” This is an issue of basis, and basis remains one of the most troubling concepts for the lay person in tax.

Basically, your basis in something is what you paid for it less whatever you’ve taken out of it. For an S Corporation, there are two bases: stock (capital) and loan. If you take distributions in excess of basis, you have a taxable distribution.

In this case, the taxpayer signed a purchase agreement with his son to sell his son some of the stock of the business in 2002. The business had two classes of stock, and some of each kind was sold to the son. However, the son didn’t pay for it; instead, it apparently was given to his son (with a Gift Tax Return being filed for the year in question).

The IRS examined the taxpayer’s return and found that the taxpayer had distributions in excess of basis in 2003. The Court had to determine whether there was or wasn’t basis and, therefore, whether or not there was or wasn’t a taxable distribution.

The Court began by noting the obvious:

[W]hile a taxpayer is free to organize his affairs as he chooses, nevertheless, once having done so, he must accept the tax consequences of his choice, whether contemplated or not.

The gift of the stock was noted on the 2002 Gift Tax Return, and that really was the case.

Today, I had a client call me wondering whether or not he could take a distribution from an S Corporation without having basis. I told him he could, but he’d have a taxable gain. Just ten minutes later, I read this case. Hopefully he’ll get the idea that if you don’t have basis, you do have a gain if you take a distribution.

Case: Milller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2011-189

No Records and Other Issues Lead to a “Pro” Being an Amateur

Tuesday, July 19th, 2011

The Tax Court had to decide whether or not another individual was a professional gambler. On his return, he included his gambling winnings on a Schedule C (like a professional gambler). But was he truly a professional or was he an amateur?

Among the items I stress to my clients, first and foremost is keeping good records. (This is true for amateur gamblers, too, of course.) Did the petitioner keep good records? Well, did he keep any records? I think you know where this is going.

There’s a nine-factor test used by the Tax Court (and other courts) in determining whether an individual is a professional or an amateur in any profession. The nine factors are:

  1. Manner in which the taxpayer carries out  the activity.
  2. The expertise of the taxpayer or his advisors.
  3. The time or effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying out the activity.
  4. Expectation that assets used in the activity may appreciate in value.
  5. The success of the taxpayer in carrying out other similar or dissimilar activities.
  6. The taxpayer’s history of income or losses with respect to the activity.
  7. The amount of occasional profits, if any, earned.
  8. The financial status of the taxpayer.
  9. Elements of personal pleasure or recreation.

Today’s petitioner didn’t lose on all the factors; one was held not to apply.  That said, first impressions are meaningful in these ‘hobby loss’ cases.  The petitioner presented no records at the trial.  There were some records from the casinos, but they were deemed unreliable by the Court.  Finally, the petitioner gambled at slot machines, and it’s highly unlikely that any court will find someone who gambles on slots is ever a professional as it’s next to impossible for a player to win against slot machines in the long-run.

The petitioner was ruled to be an amateur gambler.  Taxdood has more.

Case: Moore v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-173

Is a Taxpayer Liable for the Accuracy Penalty When a Preparer Omits a 1099?

Tuesday, June 14th, 2011

Everyone is human. Sometimes we forget that 1099 on the tax return. Today, the Tax Court looked at a case where a tax professional omitted just one 1099. The problem was that this 1099 represented $3.4 million of income, and the IRS assessed a $104,295 accuracy-related penalty. The petitioner argued that because he relied on the advice of a professional, he shouldn’t have to pay the accuracy-related penalty. The IRS disagreed, and The Tax Court had to decide what to do.

The basic facts weren’t in dispute. The petitioners ended a “swap” transaction, and realized $3.4 million of income in 2006. For reasons that are unknown, the 1099 from Deutsche Bank didn’t make it on to their return. Mind you, this wasn’t a simple return: “Petitioners’ payors reported that income to petitioners and to the IRS on more than 160 information returns, e.g., Schedules K-1 and Forms 1099, including the Deutsche Bank Forms 1099-MISC and 1099-INT…For 2006 petitioners filed 27 State income tax returns and a joint Federal income tax return.” The return itself was 115 pages thick.

There also wasn’t a dispute about the taxpayers using a professional. “To prepare their 2006 Federal income tax return, petitioners hired Venture Tax Services, Inc. (“VTS”), a niche firm specializing in tax work for private equity and hedge funds as well as such funds’ general partners…The VTS employee charged with actually preparing the return was a Massachusetts certified public accountant (“C.P.A.”) who similarly had more than 20 years of tax compliance experience, including employment with major accounting firms.”

The IRS discovered the omission, and assessed the additional tax. This increased the total tax from $3.7 million to $4.2 million. The petitioners paid the tax and interest, but disputed the penalty. The law allows,

A taxpayer who is otherwise liable for the accuracy-related penalty may avoid the liability if he can show, under section 6664(c)(1), that he had reasonable cause for a portion of the underpayment and that he acted in good faith with respect to that portion.

And relying on a professional is an exception: “Reliance on * * * professional advice * * *constitutes reasonable cause and good faith if, under all the circumstances, such reliance was reasonable and the taxpayer acted in good faith.”

The problem for the petitioners was that, in the view of the Tax Court, no advice was given by the professional that the income shouldn’t have been included.

The taxpayer must show (in the words of Neonatology Associates, 115 T.C. at 99 (emphasis added)) that he “relied in good faith on the adviser’s judgment.” Petitioners present no testimony of the preparer (nor any other evidence) to show that the income was omitted from the return because of any “analysis or conclusion” or “judgment” by VTS that the income was not taxable. When the Supreme Court discussed the “reasonable cause” defense in Boyle, it characterized the relevant professional role as giving “substantive advice”, id. at 251, and contrasted that professional function with things that “require[] no special training”, id. at 252. No “special training” was required for Mr. Woodsum to know that the law required him to include on that return an item of income that he had received and that Deutsche Bank had reported on Form 1099.

A similar theory allows for a return preparer’s error to allow for the removal of the accuracy-related penalty. But the petitioners fail here, too. First, the case was submitted fully stipulated, and there was no stipulation regarding the cause of the error. Second, there was no evidence that the taxpayers spent time reviewing the return.

“Even if all data is furnished to the preparer, the taxpayer still has a duty to read the return and make sure all income items are included.” Magill v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 465, 479-480 (1978), affd. 651 F.2d 1233 (6th Cir. 1981).

Mr. Woodsum, however, makes no showing of a review reasonable under the circumstances. He personally ordered the termination that gave rise to the income; he received a Form 1099-MISC reporting that income; that amount should have shown up on Schedule D as a distinct item; but it was omitted…A review undertaken to “make sure all income items are included” (in the words of Magill)–or even a review undertaken only to make sure that the major income items had been included–should, absent a reasonable explanation to the contrary, have revealed an omission so straightforward and substantial.

The Tax Court concluded,

That is, when his own receiving of income was in question, Mr. Woodsum was evidently alert and careful. But when he was signing his tax return and reporting his tax liability, his routine was so casual that a half million-dollar understatement of that liability could slip
between the cracks. We cannot hold that this understatement was attributable to reasonable cause and good faith.

Case: Woodsum v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. No. 29

When You’re Frivolous, Reconsidering the Frivolity Can be Expensive

Thursday, June 2nd, 2011

Every so often I report on a frivolous case at the Tax Court. You know, the people who claim that only income earned outside of the US is subject to tax, or that I’m a citizen of California, not the United States, etc. Here’s my helpful hint: Don’t try this at home.

In the years I’ve been writing this blog (six and counting), I can’t recall a full decision of the Tax Court on a frivolous case…until now. Yesterday, the Tax Court looked at Scott Wnuck. At his trial in Columbia, South Carolina, he was hit with a $1,000 penalty for bringing a frivolous case. Mr. Wnuck asked the Court to reconsider, with the grounds being that the Court had not adequately addressed his
arguments. Mr. Wnuck got his wish: The Tax Court did reconsider his case.

Of course, sometimes you have to be careful of what you ask for: The penalty for bringing a frivolous matter to the Tax Court was increased to $5,000. Joe Kristan has more.