Another professional gambler went to Tax Court seeking to stop Section 165(d) of the Tax Code–the section that stops a gambler from deducting losses in excess of wins. This ended up being a full decision of the Tax Court, so it’s worth taking a look at it.
Today’s taxpayer is a CPA from California who, in his off time, is also a professional gambler betting on horse racing. He filed his tax returns with two Schedule C’s: one for his tax practice and one for his gambling. He, though, took his gambling losses (in excess of wins) to help lower his accounting income. He also took a deduction for “Takeout” from horse racing. The IRS objected to both, and the dispute made its way to Tax Court.
Let’s deal with the more mundane “Takeout” issue. Horse race betting is a form of “pool” accounting. Individuals make wagers, they form a pool, the race happens with winners being declared, and the track pays out from the pool. The track deducts from the pool taxes and other business expenses. That’s the Takeout–it’s taken out of the pool. (It’s akin to the rake on a hand of poker).
The problem is that this isn’t an expense of the bettor; it’s an expense of the track. Thus, since the wagerer doesn’t pay it, he can’t deduct it. The Court succinctly came to that conclusion.
The more interesting part of the case is whether Section 165(d) is legal. The petitioner noted an excerpt from Tschetschot v. Commissioner (T.C. Memo 2007-38):
The moral climate surrounding gambling has changed since the tax provisions concerning wagering were enacted many years ago. Not only has tournament poker become a nationally televised event, but casinos or lotteries can be found in many States. Further, the ability for the Internal Revenue Service to accurately track money being lost and won has improved, and some of the substantiation concerns, particularly for professionals, no longer exist. That said, the Tax Court is not free to rewrite the Internal Revenue Code and regulations. We are bound by the law as it currently exists, and we are without the ability to speculate on what it should be.
The basis of petitioner’s argument is:
Petitioner responds to the last two sentences of the quoted excerpt from Tschetschot with the hope that “the judiciary is at some time [presumably, meaning this Court in this case] going to take a bold stance and help to reverse section 165(d) of the Internal Revenue Code.”
A law can be held unconstitutional if it doesn’t have a rational basis. The Tax Court looked at the Congressional commentary from when Section 23(g) of the Revenue Act of 1934 (which has identical language to the current Section 165(d)) was passed and found there was, indeed, a rational basis. First, here’s the commentary:
Section 23(g). Wagering losses: Existing law does not limit the deduction of losses from gambling transactions where such transactions are legal. Under the interpretation of the courts, illegal gambling losses can only be taken to the extent of the gains on such transactions. A similar limitation on losses from legalized gambling is provided for in the bill. Under the present law many taxpayers take deductions for gambling losses but fail to report gambling gains. This limitation will force taxpayers to report their gambling gains if they desire to deduct their gambling losses.
The Tax Court’s conclusion is that Congress must change the law:
The basis for the enactment of section 23(g), as set forth in the last sentence of the foregoing committee report, still pertains to taxpayer reporting of gambling gains and losses. Therefore, it still constitutes a “rational basis” for the continued application of section 165(d) to the losses. There being no constitutional impediment to the continued application of section 165(d), we reiterate our admonition in Tschetschot that this Court “is not free to rewrite the Internal Revenue Code and regulations * * * [but is] bound by the law as it currently exists”. [footnote omitted]
Thus, until Congress changes the law a professional gambler cannot deduct gambling losses in excess of wins.
